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1 Introduction 
Although international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) 
are both about providing as good protection against harm as possible to those subjected to 
it, their application does not always point to the same legal result. If there is a situation 
where a norm of humanitarian law (IHL) and a norm of international human rights law 
(IHRL) both apply at the same time to the same specific issue, confusion often arises in 
cases where there is an apparent norm conflict. How should then the interaction of the two 
regimes be settled? Answer to this question is often unclear both from the legal and policy 
perspective and different solutions have been advanced both by different judicial (and 
quasi-judicial) bodies and scholars.1 If one proceeds from the premise that both IHL and 
IHRL seek to give to individuals as best protection as possible then, as some held at a 
conference organized by the ICRC, “the interest of the victims would dictate the 
application of the highest protection in the event of antinomy.”2 For example,3 IHL, in 
contrast to IHRL, provides for a higher standard of protection when it comes to torture as it 
proscribes torture even in cases where no public officials are involved. According to the 
principle of best protection, the IHL norm should therefore trump the competing IHRL 
norm. However, when it comes to issues most pertinent to armed conflicts, such as 
deprivation of life and detention, it is the respective norms of IHRL that provide for higher 
protective standard than the competing norms of IHL. In these cases then, it should be the 
respective norms of IHRL that should prevail according to the principle. Hence it is always 
the norm which provides the highest standard of protection that should trump the other 
competing one. This principle will therefore be referred to here as the principle of best 
protection. 
                                                 
1 For an overview see: Larsen (2010) 260-276. 
2 ICRC (2003) 8. 
3 The following examples are elaborated and analyzed in more detail further bellow (section 3.2.1.2 infra). 
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 The principle of best protection is often confused with complementarity theory.4 
While the principle proceeds from the assumption that there is a norm conflict, the 
complementarity theory proceeds from the assumption that there is no such conflict. Hence, 
while the principle of best protection simply replaces a ‘weaker’ norm by a ‘stronger’ one, 
the complementarity theory provides for synergies between norms of the both regimes.5 
The principle of best protection was heavily criticized because it would “lead to 
conclusions that could sometimes be open to question.”6 The literature reviewed in this 
thesis mentions several problems relevant to IHL-IHRL interaction generally. Most often 
mentioned problems include (i.) systemic deficiency of the resulting applicable standard 
which would induce non-compliance7; (ii.) lack of specificity of purportedly higher 
standards of protection8; (iii.) unreasonably high operational demands that would result 
from application of standards inappropriate to given circumstances9; and (iv.) several 
possible unintended consequences that could, allegedly, be destructive of, or have a 
negative impact on, one or the other legal regime as such10. Nevertheless, these concerns 
are almost always mentioned in passing and lack systematic treatment. The thesis seeks to 
address this gap by critically assessing these concerns separately for international armed 
conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed conflicts (NIAC)11 in relation to the principle 
of best protection. 
                                                 
4 The distinction between the “most favourable protection of victims theory” and “complementarity theory” 
has been noted by Larsen (2010) 273. 
5 Limitation constrains do not allow for a closer examination of the complementarity theory here. For a 
succinct overview see: Ibid. 272-273. 
6 ICRC (2003) 8. 
7 See, e.g., discussion whether compliance mechanisms of one regime could work within the framework of 
another by Provost (2002) 116-117. 
8 E.g., Doswald-Beck and Vite (1993) passim; Feinstein (2005) 301; UN Commission on Human Rights 
(1998) para. 49. 
9 E.g., Prud’homme (2007) 358; Schabas (2007) 593; Sassoli and Olson (2008) 609; Larsen (2010) 273-274. 
10 E.g., Draper (1979) passim; Schabas (2007) passim; Verdirame (2008) 691; Bowring (2010) passim; 
Milanovic (2010) 462. 
11 While IAC are fought between States, NIAC are either fought between (i.) State and one (or several) armed 
groups or (ii.) between such groups. When it comes to NIAC, the thesis will only deal with the former. 
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The question to be pursued in the thesis is then the following: Is there a trend in 
international law practice that gives support for the principle of best protection and, more 
importantly, is the principle viable given the concerns (i.-iv.) identified above? The 
expression ‘identifiable trend’ implies critical exploration of the relevant practice of 
international judicial (and quasi-judicial)12 bodies. The main emphasis is placed on the 
second part of the question, however. Here, policy arguments shall be given primary 
consideration. 
The core argument is that, although the principle of best protection is not well 
supported under lex lata analysis, further considerations under lex ferenda support its 
application in non-extraterritorial NIAC. Under lex lata analysis, recent trends do not point 
to one specific use of the principle. This makes it unlikely the principle would establish 
itself as a clear solution guiding the IHL-IHRL relationship. In terms of lex ferenda, it 
would be unrealistic to apply the principle to international armed conflicts (IAC). In non-
international armed conflicts (NIAC), however, the situation is more complex. Pursuant to 
systematic analysis, an argument is made that the application of the principle to NIAC, is 
neither entirely unrealistic nor necessarily destructive of the two legal regimes. 
Before delving into the issue itself, the introduction will locate the problem within 
broader context of what has been termed as fragmentation of international law; discuss the 
issue of what actually constitutes norm conflict; outline opposing readings of the relation 
between IHL and IHRL from historical and conceptual perspectives; and finally, look at the 
nature of general principles of law in relation to norm conflict. 
1.1 Fragmentation of International Law 
The problem of conflicting norms has been discussed in connection with the so-called 
process of ‘fragmentation’ of international law. As international law is not a single 
homogenous legal order, or so the argument goes, its continuous diversification and 
expansion increases the risk that States “have to comply with mutually exclusive 
                                                 
12 By quasi-judicial bodies is meant human rights treaty bodies conclusions of which are authoritative but not 
legally binding. 
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obligations.”13 Nevertheless, although posing difficulties, the actual impact of 
fragmentation has not been found very serious14 and, indeed, some scholars find it fruitful 
to talk about ‘constitutionalization’ of international law instead.15  
There is also another sense in which ‘fragmentation’ is described which refers to 
creation of structurally biased areas of expertise (e.g., trade law, environmental law, human 
rights law) which cater to audiences with special interests and ethos.16  It follows from this 
that one can expect attempts at defining relationships between two specialized regimes to 
be surrounded by controversy. 
The debate about fragmentation is often not strictly of a legal nature and more 
theoretically oriented approaches remain important. Theoretical investigation, so far as it 
remains directly relevant to IHL-IHRL interaction, will be a crucial, but not exclusive, 
approach employed in this thesis. Other approaches will be positivist legal approach 
(mainly the first part) and policy oriented approach (second part). One of theoretical 
problems presents itself right in the beginning. When can we actually talk about norm 
conflict? 
1.2 The Nature of Norm Conflicts in Public International Law 
What it exactly means for norms ‘to be in conflict’ is a question that, on the one hand, has 
no settled answer and, on the other, the way it is answered has serious legal implications. 
Before delving into the problem, however, some preliminary issues need to be sorted out. 
First of all, ‘norm conflict’ has to be distinguished from what is called ‘conflict of 
laws’ which is just a different name for private international law dealing with conflicting 
domestic laws.17 In public international law ‘norm conflict’ refers to situation where two 
different norms contained in sources of international law enjoying the same hierarchical 
standing (e.g., treaty versus treaty or a treaty versus custom) are in apparent conflict with 
                                                 
13 Hafner (2000) 144. 
14 Koskenniemi (2006). 
15 See, e.g., Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein (2009). 
16 Koskenniemi (2009) 9; See also Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004). 
17 For recent analysis as to how relevant the rules of conflict of laws could be for public international law see: 
Michaels and Pauwelyn (2011). 
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each other. Second, as will be pointed out later, conflict of norms does not necessarily 
imply conflict of entire regimes.18 In other words, in case of law creating treaties (that is 
treaties that set up legal regimes in contrast to treaties that are intended for just a single-
issue operation), it is specific clauses that should be understood as being in conflict rather 
than entire treaties. 
Within the academic field of public international law, the dominant view is that norm 
conflict only means a situation where a party to two treaties “cannot simultaneously 
comply with its obligations under both treaties”19. The implication here is that if a State is 
party to one treaty that allows certain conduct (i.e., creates a right for the State) and, at the 
same time, to another treaty that prohibits the same conduct (i.e., imposes obligation on the 
State), there will be no conflict to solve. State can (and should) successfully comply with 
both treaties by refraining from exercising the right vested in the first treaty and, 
simultaneously, by complying with the obligation imposed by the second. Hence, as noted 
by Pauwelin, this view implicitly creates hierarchy in the law of treaties where, in respect 
to the same conduct, those containing prohibitions always trump those that contain 
permissions.20 For some, this problem serves as justification to propose a broader definition 
of norm conflict. Hence Pauwelyn, defines norm conflict as a situation when, “one norm 
constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, breach of another”21.  
Decision in favour of narrow or broad definition of norm conflict depends then 
largely on persuasiveness of policy arguments influenced, inter alia, by ones conception of 
the international legal order where a constitutionalist will tend to adopt the narrow one.22 
When applying a principle intended to solve norm conflict, it will be important to be 
conscious of the fact that the decision over what counts as norm conflict interferes with the 
operation that is, supposedly, reserved for the principle. 
                                                 
18 Campanelli (2008) 657. 
19 Jenks (1953) 426. 
20 Pauwelyn (2009) 184-188. 
21 Ibid. 175-176; This approach is also used in Milanovic (2009) 72; Milanovic (2010) 465. 
22 For defence of the prevailing view see: Marceau, (2001). For a critical rebuttal see: Vranes, (2006), 405. 
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Irrespective of which of the two methods is applied to identify whether there is a 
norm conflict, neither method determines whether the conflict is merely an apparent one or 
a genuine one. The conflict will be genuine if the terms of a provision of one treaty are not 
flexible enough to be accommodated with the terms of a provision of the other treaty. In 
that case solution can not be achieved by interpretative means and must be instead resolved 
in favour of either one or the other norm.23 The question then arises whether the principle 
seeks merely to accommodate apparent norm conflicts or whether it seeks to resolve 
genuine norm conflicts. Before looking more closely on principles, however, it is important 
to consider the specificities of norm conflicts between the IHL and IHRL.  
1.3 The Nature of Norm Conflicts between IHL and IHRL 
In the following subsections two contrary positions will be presented. On the one hand, it is 
often argued that the two bodies of law evolved separately and follow a different logic and 
that trying to impose norms of one into the domain of another is a futile, and possibly also 
dangerous, exercise. On the other hand, however, it is also often argued that there has been 
a period of convergence of the two regimes and that conceptually there is an overlap in 
purpose. This latter line of reasoning goes on to advance the view that applying norms from 
both regimes concurrently is a worthwhile exercise resulting in an improvement of 
protection. The core of the two positions is presented bellow. It should be noted, however, 
that the issue is much more complex than the theoretical division into two positions allows. 
It was rightly argued that between the two regimes “similitude and correspondence are 
sometimes overwhelmed by diversity, and […] gaps and overlaps between their rules are a 
common feature of their interrelations”24. Therefore, this section should only be read as a 
starting point to better understand the various concerns discussed in the lex ferenda section. 
                                                 
23 Milanovic (2010) 9. 
24 Vinuesa (1998) 70. 
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1.3.1 IHL and IHRL as Separate Regimes 
Painting IHL and IHRL as different and separate is not just an innocent academic exercise 
but can serve various purposes with serious political implications.25 One the one hand, it 
can serve to advance arguments against applicability of human rights during the times of 
armed conflict. On the other hand, it can also serve to highlight certain problems of such 
application while admitting for this possibility. As well predicted by more sociologically 
oriented studies of fragmentation,26 by pointing at differences, the authors may warn 
against what they perceive as dangerous intrusion of IHL into the domain of IHRL27 or, 
vice versa, as dangerous intrusion of IHRL into the domain of IHL.28 This section will 
briefly outline historical and conceptual arguments that are usually invoked in order to 
buttress these concerns. 
1.3.1.1 History of Opposition 
Supporting the claim that IHL and IHRL are distinct is usually done by reading their 
history as disconnected and separate. Rules limiting conduct of warfare are said to go back 
at least to the idea of chivalry in the Middle Ages or even much earlier.29 Human rights, on 
the other hand, are said only to emerge on the domestic level in the Age of 
Enlightenment.30 Furthermore it was only after the Second World War that human rights 
have entered international domain. 
One can also mention here the history of competitive relationship between the UN 
and the ICRC. On the one side the ICRC, which saw the UN and human rights as highly 
                                                 
25 From a linear narrative of different evolution of the IHL and IHRL regimes Barry Feinstein, for example, 
derives conceptual difference of the regimes. This then serves to support his arguments in regards to legality 
of the Palestinian security barrier, see: Feinstein (2005). 
26 See footnote 16. 
27 E.g., Bowring (2010). 
28 E.g., Draper (1979). 
29 Ober (1994). 
30 E.g., the 1628 Petition of Rights , the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act and the 1689 Bill of Rights in the UK; the 
1776 Virginia Bill of Rights in the US; the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 
France. 
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politicized, decided to exercise greatest care to preserve its “non-political character.”31 On 
the other side the International Law Commission, established by the UN and entrusted to 
promote progressive development and codification of international law, excluded laws of 
war from its work in fear it might otherwise signal “lack of confidence in the efficiency of 
the means at the disposal of the United Nations for maintaining peace”.32  As a result, the 
1949 GCI-GCIV33 and the 1948 UDHR contain no reference to each other.34 
1.3.1.2 Difference in Logic 
When it comes to provision of protection, the main conceptual difference between IHL and 
IHRL is the design by which they provide it. In respect to individuals, IHRL affords rights 
which are expected to be safeguard by acting through judicial system. IHL, presupposing 
breakdown of institutions, rather imposes individual obligations at those who poses power 
over persons in need of protection.35 
In respect to NIAC it is also important to mention the fact that while IHRL imposes 
direct obligations only on States,36 IHL is directly binding also in respect to non-State 
actors.37 Hence, while there is room for positive effects in terms of compliance arising 
from immediate reciprocity in IHL,38 under IHRL reciprocity in this sense can not exist. 
                                                 
31 ICRC (1948) 92 res. XVIII; See also accusations that UN was politicizing IHL by inserting language of 
IHRL: Draper (1979) 194-195. 
32 ILC (1949) 281 par. 18. 
33 Only abbreviations of treaties are used throughout the text. For full citations please consult bibliography. 
34 Kolb (1998) 409. 
35 Provost (2000), 16-117; 344-345; Sassoli and Bouvier (2006) 348-349. 
36 From a legal positivist view this remains the case although the issue of application of IHRL to non-state 
actors is becoming increasingly challenged. Two more things should be mentioned however. First, it is 
uncontested that non-State actors are bound indirectly by human rights obligations through domestic law 
which remains binding. Second, even if one agreed that non-state actors are bound directly by IHRL, some of 
these obligations can only be implemented by States. For an overview of the relevant literature see: Clapham 
(2006). 
37Zegveld (2002).  
38 Nevertheless, in respect to NIAC there remain problems with what Provost has called systemic reciprocity 
– that is reciprocity where equality of participants leads to equal interest towards preservation of the 
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 One of the ways in which the systemic difference of IHL and IHRL manifests itself 
has been described as ‘linguistic.’39 Of special concern is the usage of the same term 
which, under each of the two bodies of law, denotes essentially a very different concept. 
An often cited example is the term ‘proportionality’ which is considered as one of the core 
principles under both IHL and IHRL. Under IHRL the principle of proportionality requires 
that a State agent, while following a legitimate aim, may in respect to an individual use 
only as much force as is absolutely necessary.40 In contrast, under IHL proportionality 
requires that an assessment be made considering, on the one side, expected collateral 
damage and, on the other side, anticipated military advantage. Collateral damage then shall 
not be excessive in respect to military advantage.41 Hence, while under IHRL States are 
obliged to minimize force as much as possible, there is no such requirement under classic 
IHL42 where, as long as military advantage is gained, the loss of human lives is acceptable 
if militarily feasible precautions43 are taken. Furthermore, while under IHRL any use of 
force has to strictly follow a legitimate aim, under IHL legitimacy of aim (i.e., the purpose 
of gaining the military advantage in the first place) is irrelevant as the whole body of IHL is 
predicated upon the idea of separation between jus in bello and jus ad bellum.44 
                                                                                                                                                    
normative system – which remains a force behind non compliance with IHL. See: Provost (2002) 122, 161-
162. 
39 Lubell (2005) 744-746. 
40 Under ECHR this follows from the article 2(2) that allows for IHL logic only after derogation under article 
15(2), something which has never been done in practice. Under ICCPR this follows from interpreting the 
term ‘arbitrary’ in article 6(1) in conformity with UDHR (Art. 29) and soft law standards which, however, 
only apply to military as far as they conduct police powers. See: Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials (1979); Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990). 
41 Art. 51(5)(b) AP Ι. IHL does not give precise criteria by which to determine what constitutes military 
advantage. Hence the determination is largely left to commander’s discretion. It is also important to stress 
here that military advantage can only be of in bello character and not, for example, to rescue of civilians. 
42 As will be explained later, there has been a push towards the standard requiring no more than necessary use 
of force even under IHL. Nevertheless, as Arne Willy Dahl has remarked, the situation on the battlefield will 
normally require use of superrior power, see: Dahl (2003) 26. 
43 Art. 57(2)(a)(ii) AP I. 
44 On the importance of the separation between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello see e.g., Sassoli (2007). 
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 The reason for the difference of the two approaches in respect to the use of force is 
simple. While IHRL seeks to regulate unequal relationship between State and its citizens, 
IHL seeks to minimize the scourge of war by equally subjecting belligerents to one 
common set of rules irrespective of whose aim is legitimate. 
1.3.2 IHL and IHRL as Converging Regimes 
The laws of war, today called humanitarian law,45 did not entirely escape the influence of 
human rights.46 It is argued that in the course of recent past there has been a process of 
convergence of the two regimes “that has been substantial, both with regard to concept and 
the field of application”.47 This line of reasoning is intended to enhance protection by, inter 
alia, removing protection gaps where neither IHL nor IHRL has reach;48 to enhance 
existing protection under IHL and IHRL through interpretation of certain norms in light of 
one another;49 or by the desire to apply the highest standard of protection.50 That other 
political motives with serious implications are often involved is also beyond doubt.51 
1.3.2.1 History of Mutual Influence 
The beginning of the period of convergence is usually attributed to the year 1968 Teheran 
Conference where the aim was to increase protection of the human person also in times of 
                                                 
45 In the past, the body of law regulating the conduct of hostilities was known as ‘the laws and customs of 
war.’ Today it is referred to as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – a name suggesting influence by 
human rights movement. Nevertheless, some also use the name ‘Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).’ See: 
Dinstein, (2004) 12-14. 
46 For a detailed study on this issue see: Meron (2000). 
47 Eide (1984) 695. 
48 Consider, for example, the article 10(1) ICCPR ensuring humane treatment of detainees that is not listed as 
non-derogable under article 4(2). While derogations are allowed only in time of “public emergency”, this 
does not mean that IHL is automatically applicable unless the threshold of “armed conflict” is reached. See: 
Eide, Rosas and Meron (1995); Turku Declaration, Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1991). 
49 E.g., Droege (2007); Quénivet (2008); Sassoli and Olson (2008).  
50 E.g., Naftali and Michaeli (2003). 
51 See the charges of political motivations made by Draper in respect to the resolutions adopted at the 1968 
Teheran Conference (see footnote 31). 
 10
armed conflict.52 The process continued with the adoption of the two additional protocols 
to Geneva Conventions in 1977 which, at least in some respects such as detention, were 
directly inspired by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.53  
Conversely, human rights instruments also started to be influenced by humanitarian 
law. The CRC, by substance and supervisory mechanism clearly a human rights instrument, 
set down a rule expressly applicable in armed conflicts in respect of recruitment of 
children.54 This trend has continued until today and it is visible, for example, in various 
resolutions by the Security Council.55   
1.3.2.2 Overlap in Purpose 
While one can concede that IHL and IHRL operate under different logics, it is also true that 
the two regimes overlap in purpose concerning the aim to give to individuals as best 
protection as possible. While in respect of IHRL this fact is hardly disputable, in respect of 
IHL it is often asserted that the latter regime constitutes “a compromise based on a balance 
between military necessity, on the one hand, and the requirements of the humanity, on the 
other’.56 Nevertheless, it is sometimes cautioned that the view of IHL as a ‘balance’ where 
considerations of humanity are necessarily offset by considerations of military necessity is 
not precise.57 Nils Melzer, among others58, advanced the view that the principle of 
necessity has a restrictive function itself59 and went as far as to argue that even combatants 
can not be killed where they can be captured “without additional risk to operating 
                                                 
52 International Conference on Human Rights (1968); UNGA Res. 2444 (1968). Note that the titles of the 
resolutions seem to be confusing IHL as simply being a special branch of IHRL. 
53 Compare, for example, articles 14, 15 and 16 of ICCPR with article 75 AP I and articles 4, 5 and 6 AP II. 
54 Art. 38 CRC, see also the optional protocol of 2000 entitled “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.” 
55 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 1325 (2000) [on the protection of women in armed conflict]; UNSC Res. 1894 (2009) 
[on the protection of civilians in armed conflict]; UNSC Res. 1998 (2011) [on the protection of children in 
armed conflict]. 
56 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (1987), Art. 35 AP I, para. 1389; See also: Watkin (2004) 9. 
57 For a nuanced analysis of military necessity see: Hayashi (2010). 
58 An early influential proponent of this view was Meyrowitz (1994). 
59 E.g., Melzer (2008) 286-288. 
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forces”.60 The same suggestion was reiterated in recent ICRC guidelines written by the 
same author.61 The problem with this view is that it relies on military necessity as a 
principle of humanitarian law rather than treaty law (where it was intentionally omitted) or 
customary law (the ICRC customary study does not contain it as an individual rule). Not 
only is this view legally contentious, it has simply not been “translated into actual 
battlefield instructions, even less into actual battlefield behaviour”.62 
 Nevertheless, the importance of humanitarian considerations in IHL should not be 
underestimated. It was mostly reflected in the adoption of the GC IV that aims at protection 
of civilians. Some provisions of Geneva Conventions do not only impose obligations but 
also speak of rights that not even the protected persons themselves could renounce (Art. 7 
GC I –GC III; 8 GC IV).63 A special mentions of the article 3 common to all Geneva 
Conventions (hereinafter CA 3) should also be made. In words of one author this provision 
constitutes “a kind of human rights provision”64 as it addresses the relationship between 
individual and State.65 
To what extent this partial overlap in purpose of the two regimes could translate into 
an integrated system of protection depends also on the means by which relationships 
between competing norms are regulated. The next section is devoted, therefore, to 
discussion of basic principles that have been widely used for this purpose albeit until 
recently mostly in other contexts. 
1.4 Principles as Solutions to Norm Conflicts 
The existence of the notion of ‘general principles of law’ as one of the valid sources of 
public international law is today undisputed. It is routinely derived from the article 38(c) of 
                                                 
60 Melzer (2008) 288; for an opposite view see: Watkin (2005) 148. 
61 ICRC (2009) 80-82. 
62 Sassoli and Olson (2008) 606. 
63 Nevertheless, the underlying rationale for affording inalienable rights under IHL differs from that under 
IHRL.  
64 Schindler (2003) 171. 
65 This description is not exactly accurate as State must not necessarily be Party to the armed conflict for the 
CA 3 to apply. 
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the Statute of the International Court of Justice which, as an annex, forms integral part of 
the UN Charter. This is despite the fact that, strictly speaking, the article is only binding for 
the Court. 
 The ICJ statute, however, leaves the meaning of the term ‘general principles of law’ 
unclear. The classic view is that general principles embody principles of private and public 
law administered in domestic courts66 where such principles are both widely shared among 
countries representing all the main legal systems of the world67 and where they are 
applicable to international relations.68 Nevertheless the term is used in different ways.69 
In modern doctrine, general principles tend to be understood as also encompassing 
principles reflected on a widespread basis in State practice on the international plane, 
discernible as abstractions from numerous international treaties or other standard-setting 
documents, or which are necessary as logical propositions of legal reasoning (e.g., equality 
of States). Brownlie categorizes these as principles of international law.70 
 When it comes to regulation of relations between norms possessing equal rank, 
three general principles are recognized as present in all domestic legal systems.71 First, lex 
posterior derogat priori (a later law repeals an earlier one). Second, lex posterior generalis 
non derogat priori speciali (a later law, general in character, does not derogate from an 
earlier one, which is special in character). And third, lex specialis derogat generali (a 
special law prevails over a general law). As is apparent, these principles have a form of 
                                                 
66 Brierly, (1963) 57-63. 
67 The article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ statute, in a language still somewhat influenced by colonialism, requires 
general principles of law to be “recognized by civilized nations” while the more recent ICC statute allows the 
Court to derive general principles of law from “national laws of legal systems of the world” (Art. 21(1)(c)). 
68 Oppenheim (1955) 29. 
69 In literature there is tendency to use the term ‘principle’ to denote custom. Even the ICC statute, for 
example, does not use the term customary law but rather makes distinction between “principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict” (Art. 
21(1)(b)) and “general principles of law derived by the court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world” (Art. 21(1)(c)). 
70 Brownlie (2008) 19; See also: Koskenniemi (2000). 
71 Cassese (2005) 154. 
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short maxims which are not intended to provide comprehensive solution to legal problems. 
At best, they provide a vague guidance that may or may not be useful in a given case.  
In public international law, lex posterior, being reflected in VCLT (Art. 30) is 
relatively clear and uncontested. Nevertheless, it is completely irrelevant when it comes to 
IHL-IHRL relationship as both areas of law were developed at different points in time in 
several waves, independently of each other and without any indication of intention for one 
to supersede the other.72  
The lex specialis principle, has been found useful in situations when terms of a 
specific treaty do not provide enough guidance in respect to certain issue by allowing the 
parties to the given treaty to ‘fall back’ on general international law.73 It is questionable, 
however, whether the principle is useful at all when it comes to resolving norm conflicts 
between two law creating treaties. The principle is nowhere to be found within the VCLT 
and the content and nature of the principle is subject to much debate.74 Moreover, although 
the principle has been used for accommodation of two conflicting norms there is “simply 
no evidence that lex specialis is in fact a rule of conflict resolution [emphasis added].”75 
Despite of this fact, it is undisputable that the term enjoys a prominent place within 
discussions about IHL-IHRL interplay.76 Somewhat heretically perhaps, it is another 
principle this thesis will strive to critically examine. 
The principle of best protection differs from lex posterior and lex specialis in that it 
is forward looking, i.e., teleological in nature. It is more akin to principles of legal 
reasoning rather than principles of law strictly speaking. In contrast to the other principles 
of interpretation, its basis lacks a formal structure. Instead it is based on perceived 
appropriateness in relation to shared purpose of IHL and IHRL. 
                                                 
72 In this respect see e.g., Kolb (1998) 409-419. 
73 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Art. 55). See also: Simma and Pulkowski (2010) 148-150. 
74 Lindroos (2005); Prud’homme (2007); McCarthy (2008). 
75 Milanovic (2010), p. 475. 
76 The authoritative ‘guidelines’ by the ILC make it difficult to ignore this principle, see: Koskenniemi (2006) 
paras. 56-122. Yet, there seems to be a move away from considering this principle as the prime solution, see: 
Eden and Happold (2010) 422. 
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1.5 Overview of the Chapters 
After the chapters discussing introduction and methodology, the third chapter begins by 
outlining the applicability of the two regimes separately. It highlights contested issues of 
what constitutes armed conflict in IHL and whether IHRL can apply extraterritorially. It 
then proceeds to show that there is a significant support for concluding that the two regimes 
can apply at the same time. The fourth chapter begins by discussing the principle of best 
protection against trends in judicial and quasi judicial practice. After arriving at the 
conclusion that the support for the principle is scant, it proceeds to evaluate viability of the 
principle from a more policy oriented perspective. The second part of the fourth chapter is 
a lex ferenda analysis. It constitutes the core of the thesis where the principle of best 
protection is systematically evaluated. The overall result of the analysis is presented in the 
conclusion which rejects the principle of best protection as not viable in IAC but accepts 
that the principle is viable in non-extraterritorial NIAC. In the end it is suggested that the 
viability test be further refined and applied to other proposed solutions of norm conflict 
between IHL and IHRL for comparative purposes. 
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2 Methodology 
The overall approach differs in the two parts of the thesis. While the first part follows 
basically a black letter positivist approach, the second and main part adopts a more policy 
oriented approach.77 Pursuant to the fact that the principle of best protection is a contested 
concept, the research design adopted here provides for strict division between lex lata and 
lex ferenda analysis.  
The first part, lex lata anlysis, starts by considering treaty regimes separately and 
then together by focusing on the issue of applicability. At points where more guidance is 
needed, this is drawn from judicial and quasi-judicial practice. 
The second and main part, lex ferenda analysis, follows a strict design allowing for 
a systematic evaluation. Viability of the principle of best protection is evaluated against 
four requirements. Based on the reviewed material I have identified (i.) compliance 
requirement, (ii.) specificity requirement, (iii.) reasonableness requirement and (iv.) 
integrity requirement. Each requirement tests the viability of the principle separately for 
IAC and NIAC. As these four issues, albeit under different headings, were constantly 
brought up by different authors in different ways, it was safe to conclude that these would 
form a good basis for evaluation of the principle. Although this umbrella approach might 
be more familiar to political scientists rather than lawyers, it well suits the purpose of 
evaluation of the principle in the light of pragmatic concerns.  
The compliance requirement tests whether the principle would enhance, preserve or 
undermine systemic mechanisms by which the law applicable in times of armed conflict 
aims to ensure compliance. The test thus first identifies what the most crucial mechanisms 
are and subsequently evaluates the impact of the principle. The importance of this 
requirement is simple. There is little sense in advocating for principle that would result in 
law that has little or no chance to be complied with.  
                                                 
77 For an overview of different approaches to International Law see: Slaughter and Ratner (1999). 
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The specificity requirement tests whether the principle would bring into play 
specific or rather vague norms unsuitable for times of armed conflict. The importance of 
this requirement rests on the assumption that clarity of norms impacts on compliance and 
operational effectiveness.  
The reasonableness requirement tests whether the norms brought into play by the 
principle would introduce unreasonably high demands on military operations. Hence, the 
importance of this requirement rests on assumption that reasonability of demands that the 
norms require impacts, as in the previous requirement, on compliance and operational 
effectiveness.  
Finally, the integrity requirement tests whether the principle would affect the IHL 
or the IHRL regime as a whole in a negative way. The importance of this requirement lies 
in potential severity of unintended consequences resulting from the principle of best 
protection that would outweigh the positive effects. The test thus first identifies and then 
assesses the potential unintended consequences. 
The strength of this approach lies in the fact that it allows for focus on pragmatic 
assessment of the principle. Yet, as any approach, it also comes with certain drawbacks. 
2.1 Limitations 
The main limitation when it comes to the lex lata analysis is that in the end it is limited 
only to critical assessment of whether trends in judicial and quasi-judicial practice give 
persuasive support to the principle. Hence no comprehensive attempt is made to settle the 
issue. 
 When it comes to the lex ferenda analysis, first of all it can not be ruled out that a 
choice of different requirements could lead to a different result. This means that the 
viability test is only persuasive as far as inclusion of each of the requirements tests is 
justified. Second, the result of the analysis depends on the way each of the chosen 
requirements is tested. Further effort is therefore made to justify not only inclusion of each 
of the individual tests but also their designs in the respective sections. Third, due to word 
count limitations the analysis of IAC excludes situations of occupation while the analysis 
of NIAC only includes situations where a State is a party to the conflict. 
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Applicability of IHL and IHRL 
As the principle of best protection presupposes that each of the two competing norms of 
IHL and IHRL are independently applicable, it is necessary to at least give a very basic 
outline of the issues concerning applicability of each. Hence, the purpose of this section is 
not to give a full and exhaustive account of the issues concerning applicability of the two 
regimes. Rather, the focus is on contested issues.78   
2.2 Applicability of IHL 
In terms of ratione materiae, there is a large body of IHL instruments applying to situations 
of “armed conflict” in IAC and NIAC.79 
In terms of ratione personae, IHL binds States; international organizations;80 
organized armed groups; and, most importantly, individuals. In addition, there is a passive 
personality scope in IAC which defines differentiated protected categories of wounded, 
sick and shipwrecked (Arts. 13 GC I – GC II; 8(a),(b) AP I), prisoners of war (Arts. 4 GC 
III; 43, 44(1) AP I), and civilians (Arts. 4 GC IV; 50 AP I). 
 In terms of ratione temporis, IHL will start to apply at the moment at which an 
armed conflict (both IAC and NIAC) erupts as a matter of objective fact.81 Applicability 
ceases, again as a matter of objective fact for IAC “on the general close of military 
operations” (Arts. 6(2) GC IV; 3(b) AP I) and for NIAC at the “end of the armed conflict” 
(Art. 2(2) AP I). 
                                                 
78 This is important as courts are often tempted to avoid norm conflicts by ruling that one or the other regime 
is inapplicable to the given situation because requirements for applicability of the regime in question are not 
met. 
79 It is unnecessary to list all the relevant IHL instruments here. For a treaty collection see: Roberts and Guelff 
(2000); See also the table of international instruments in: Fleck (2008). 
80 See, e.g., UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law (1999). 
81 Tadic Jurisdiction, ICTY (1995) para. 70. 
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 In terms of ratione loci, the IHL applies mainly pursuant to principle of 
effectiveness on the entire territory of the State where the armed conflict is occurring 
whether in IAC or NIAC.82 
 The issue most relevant in respect to the remit of this thesis is the problem of 
classification of what constitutes an ‘armed conflict’ in NIAC. As classification of internal 
unrest as ‘armed conflict’ by a State would imply its political weakness for domestic and 
international audiences, States are generally reluctant to apply IHL to NIAC. Hence, they 
will often argue that the situation at hand does not correspond to the threshold implied by 
the term ‘armed conflict’. Nevertheless, the ICTY has contributed in clarification of the 
term.83 In order for the situation to qualify as a non international ‘armed conflict’ it has to 
satisfy two requirements.  
First, the rebel fighters must display a minimum of organization. For example, the 
rebel fighters must have a responsible command, abide by military discipline and be 
capable of respecting the laws of war. Nevertheless, one must be wary of the fact that is 
often difficult to assess the organization of rebel groups when they operate as decentralised 
networks. What is clear, however, is that a mass of disorganized rioters would not qualify.  
Second, the armed conflict must present a minimum of intensity. By specifying what 
an armed conflict is not, the AP II gives some guidance by ruling out situations such as 
“riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” (Art. 1(2) 
AP II). These kinds of situations would therefore fall exclusively under the IHRL regime. 
2.3 Applicability of IHRL 
In terms of ratione materiae, IHRL is concerned with the regulation of the exercise of a 
State’s power over individuals. In so doing the regime provides for civil and political as 
well as economic, social and cultural rights.84 
                                                 
82 Tadic Jurisdiction, ICTY (1995) para. 68; Akayesu, ICTR (1998) paras. 635-636. 
83 Tadic Jurisdiction, ICTY (1995) para. 70; Limaj, ICTY (2005) paras. 88-89, 94-134; Haradinaj, ICTY 
(2008) paras. 37-60. 
84 Again, it is unnecessary to give a list of all the relevant treaties. For a treaty collection see: Brownlie and 
Goodwin Gill (2010). 
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 In terms of ratione personae, as far as the treaty law goes it is safe to say that it 
IHRL is only binding upon States.85 
 In terms of ratione temporis, IHRL simply applies at all times. Nevertheless, 
subject to procedural and substantive limitations, a State is allowed to derogate from 
certain rights when “life of nation”86 is threatened. The non-derogable right to life is at the 
heart of what makes the interaction between IHL and IHRL contentious. Namely, the fact 
that the right cannot be derogated from does not rule out the possibility that its content 
could nevertheless be influenced by IHL.87 
 In terms of ratione loci, a State is bound to secure rights to everyone within its 
territory although this can be relaxed to certain extent in respect to areas where the State 
has lost its ability to exercise power.88 When it comes to extraterritorial application of 
human rights, there is enough evidence to support its possibility but not enough uniformity 
of practice to show one specific modality. The obligation of a State to apply human rights 
under ICCPR extraterritorially depends on the interpretation of the requirement that 
individuals be “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” (Art. 2(1)). Although 
travaux préparatoires does not support such interpretation, the practice of UNHRC was to 
interpret the terms territory and jurisdiction disjunctively and to maintain that, essentially, 
jurisdiction equals power.89 That ICCPR can apply extraterritorially is also supported by 
                                                 
85 See footnote 36. The issue of obligations of international organizations arising from other sources than 
human rights treaty law will not be discussed here. 
86 Art 4(1) ICCPR; Art. 15(1) ECHR 
87 As was done in Nuclear Weapons, ICJ (1996) para. 25. 
88 Ilaşcu, ECtHR (2004) paras. 312, 330-331; ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Art. 23). 
89 The UNHRC in a pioneer case held that, “it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility 
under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the covenant on the 
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory” Burgos, UNHRC 
(1981), para. 12.3; see also: UNHRC General Comment No. 31 (2004) para. 10. 
 20
the practice of the ICJ.90 That the practice of the ECtHR supports the possibility of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is beyond dispute.91 
 The modality of extraterritorial application of human rights has been controversial 
however.92 As ICCPR and other regional human rights treaties differ in their wording in 
this regard, there is no universal international standard. Unlike under the wording of 
ICCPR which uses both terms ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’, the wording of ECHR only 
refers to “everyone within their jurisdiction” (Art. 1). The latest authority on the meaning 
of ‘jurisdiction’ under ECHR is the ruling where the Court held that what is decisive is “the 
exercise of physical power and control over the person in question”.93 This means, in a 
nutshell, that a State acting extraterritorially must afford protections of ECHR to those that 
it detains.94 Nevertheless, those that are not detained will fall outside of the scope of 
protection. 
2.4 Concurrent Applicability of IHL and IHRL 
That IHRL does not cease to apply simply due to presence of armed conflict is today 
largely a non issue. The application of IHRL during “war” is expressly contemplated by 
ECHR (Art. 15(1)), ACHR (Art. 27(1)) and implied by the wording of ICCPR (Art. 4(1)).  
That applicability of IHL does not make IHRL inapplicable is implied in AP I which 
requires that, in order to give effect to protection of civilians, “rules, which are additional 
to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed” (Art. 51(1)). Even more 
expressly, it recalls that, “international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic 
protection to the human person” (Art. 72). Similarly the AP II in its preamble recalls that, 
                                                 
90 Wall, ICJ (2004) paras 111, 113; Congo, ICJ (2005), para. 216. Nevertheless, some States (e.g. USA, 
Israel) have expressed strong disagreements with this interpretations. 
91 G v UK and Ireland, ECiHR (1985) para. 25; Loizidou Preliminary Objections, ECtHR (1995) para. 62; 
Bankovic, ECtHR (2001) para. 71; Issa, ECtHR (2004), paras. 69-71; Öcalan, ECtHR (2005) para. 91; Al-
Skeini, ECtHR (2011) para 136. 
92 A recent monograph on this issue is: Milanovic (2011). 
93 Al-Skeini, ECtHR (2011) para. 136. 
94 This arguably creates incentive to resort to lethal use of force in cases where detention would have been a 
viable alternative. 
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“international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human 
person”. That the two regimes can be applicable at the same time is further confirmed by 
the practice of, inter alia: ICJ,95 UNSC,96 UNGA,97 UNHRC98 and IACiHR.99 A brief 
look through the rules and practice presented above does not allow for setting out 
conclusively how the two regimes are to interact. Nevertheless, it suffices to conclude that 
the possibility of applicability of the two regimes at the same time is a legal fact. Yet, how 
is the relationship to work? 
                                                 
95 Nuclear Weapons, ICJ (1996) para. 25; Wall, ICJ (2004) para. 106; Congo, ICJ (2005) para. 216. 
96 UNSC Res. 237 (1967); UNSC Res. 1041 (1996). 
97 UNGA Res. 2252 (1967); UNGA Res. 2444 (1968); UNGA Res. 2675 (1970); UNGA Res. 58/96 (2003) 
paras. 3, 5; UNGA Res. 58/99 (2003) paras. 2, 5. 
98 UNHRC, General Comment No. 29 (2001) para. 3; UNHRC, General Comment No. 31 (2004) para. 11.  
99 Coard, IACiHR (1999) para. 39; Abella, IACiHR (1997) para. 158. 
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3 The Principle of Best Protection 
As already mentioned, one proposed way to settle the IHL-IHRL relationship is to rely on 
the principle of best protection. Yet, is this really a generally supported solution and is it 
viable in any circumstances? In order to pursue answers to these questions this chapter is 
divided into lex lata and lex ferenda sections. While the first section does not aim to be 
comprehensive, the second part constitutes the main part of the thesis. 
3.1 Support by Trends in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Practice 
Although treaty law does not support the proposition that the principle of best protection 
shall decide norm conflicts between IHL and IHRL, some provisions under IHL treaty law 
make explicit use of the principle in limited circumstances. For example, GC III requires 
that members of crews of the merchant marine and civil aircraft shall only be given 
prisoner of war status if they do not benefit of “more favourable treatment under any other 
provisions of international law [emphasis added]” (Art. 4(A)(5)). When it comes to 
provisions of fundamental guarantees of detainees under AP I, it is required that they be not 
“construed as limiting or infringing any other more favourable provision granting greater 
protection, under any applicable rules of international law [emphasis added]” (Art. 75(8)). 
These provisions, however, are very specific and applicable only to very narrow range of 
circumstances. One can not deduce from them a general principle of best protection 
guiding the relationship between all conflicting norms of IHL and IHRL. Hence, one must 
turn for support elsewhere. 
When it comes to practice of the ICJ the Court agreed that the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life under ICCPR also applies in hostilities and argued that the 
meaning of ‘arbitrarily’ then “falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, 
the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of 
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hostilities”.100 However, the case was resolved in the light of jus ad bellum as the Court 
could not reach a “definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival 
would be at stake”.101 This suggest a truly hybrid standard as in respect to use of force, any 
deprivation of life must be proportionate in relation to anticipated military advantage (IHL 
logic) as well as following a legitimate aim (IHRL logic).102 Although relevancy of the 
principle of lex specialis is repeated in the Wall advisory opinion,103 the principle was 
actually not applied by the court in that case. In the Congo case the Court refrained from 
even mentioning the principle and, like in the Wall, simply applied both IHL and IHRL. 
However, one can not conclude from this that the principle of best protection was applied 
in any of the cases as the court refrained from mentioning any norm conflict. 
 Similarly, the practice of UNHRC, does not give conclusive support to the principle 
of best protection. In its general comments the Committee recalled that, “rules of 
international humanitarian law become applicable and help, in addition to the provisions in 
article 4 and article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, to prevent the abuse of a State’s 
emergency powers”104 and that, “both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually 
exclusive”105. Again, there is a presumption of absence of any possible norm conflicts. 
Moreover, when the Committee says that IHL helps ‘in addition to’ IHRL, it does not 
necessarily mean that the norms of IHRL providing better protection should take 
precedence over those norms of IHL that are less protective. Equally possible is an 
interpretation that the Committee simply meant that both IHL and IHRL are applicable at 
the same time. In conclusion, one cannot draw persuasive support for the principle of best 
protection from the two General Comments. 
                                                 
100 Nuclear Weapons, ICJ (1996) para. 25. 
101 Ibid. para. 97. 
102 In contrast to this interpretation of lex specialis, the principle of best protection does not combine 
protective standards and keeps them separate. 
103 Wall, ICJ (2004) para. 106. 
104 UNHRC, General Comment No. 29 para. 3. 
105 UNHRC, General Comment No. 31 para. 11. 
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 From the practice of regional treaty bodies, the most persuasive support for the 
principle of best protection comes from the practice of IACiHR. In the Abella case the 
Commission boldly asserted that, “where there are differences between legal standards 
governing the same or comparable rights in the American Convention and a humanitarian 
law instrument, the Commission is duty bound to give legal effort to the provision(s) of 
that treaty with the higher standard(s) applicable to the right(s) or freedom(s) in 
question”106.  
 The practice of ECtHR does not give support to the principle of best protection as 
what the European Court does is simply applying ECHR without any express reference to 
IHL even when it acknowledges presence of armed insurrection. In the 2011 Al-Jedda case 
the Court did not recognize that it was facing a norm conflict between a UN Security 
Council Resolution (containing authorization) and ECHR (containing obligations) and 
thereby avoided it.107 However, as the Court simply applies standards of IHRL to situations 
of armed conflict, it remains vulnerable to critique that the standards applied are 
inadequate. These concerns will be explored in the main part of the thesis bellow. 
 In conclusion, trends in judicial and quasi-judicial practice give only scant support 
to the principle of best protection. The most persuasive support of the principle comes from 
the single case of IACiHR. Yet, the question whether the principle should be supported or 
not remains. 
3.2 Lex Ferenda Analysis: Viability of the Principle 
To arrive at the conclusion whether the principle is feasible, it will be tested against four 
requirements as described in the methodology section (see chapter 2) for IAC and NIAC 
separately. 
3.2.1 The Compliance Requirement 
This section discusses whether the principle of best protection has a chance to be complied 
with under IAC and NIAC respectively. The first part dismisses applicability of the 
                                                 
106 Abella, IACiHR (1997) para. 165. 
107 Al-Jedda, EctHR (2011) para. 102. 
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principle of best protection to IAC on the basis of lack of immediate reciprocity under the 
IHRL regime. The second part argues that the situation is different in NIAC where 
unilateral application of IHRL by a State in respect of rebels would serve to alleviate the 
unequal position of belligerents under IHL. It proceeds by discussing positive effects on 
compliance by applying higher protective standards of IHRL. It then moves to discuss the 
same by looking at higher protective standards of IHL and concludes by clarifying how the 
principle of best protection is to work in practice. 
3.2.1.1 Compliance Test: IAC 
If IHRL norms were applied to IAC through the principle of best protection they would not 
be complied with. This is because the principle would destroy the reciprocal mechanism 
which remains crucial in IAC.108 First of all, while the Geneva Conventions enjoy almost 
universal acceptance (194 parties), this is less so with ICCPR (167 parties) not to speak of 
regional systems of human rights protection. Second, while the application of IHL to the 
opposing party is conditioned on its ratification of the Conventions, the application of 
IHRL is conditioned on unilateral ratification of the Covenant by the party that is to apply 
it. Hence, while there is an element of immediate reciprocity under IHL regime, there is no 
such element under the IHRL regime. It would be a futile exercise to insist that a State 
should apply a much higher standard of protection in respect to individuals of a hostile 
State while that State would not be obliged to do the same in return. As the principle of best 
protection leads to unequal rights and obligations, it would disintegrate the reciprocal 
system. As a result, the principle of best protection would lead to worse protection due to 
poorer compliance rate. The principle thus fails the test. 
                                                 
108 Although there are other mechanisms by which international law aims to secure compliance of States with 
laws applicable in times of armed conflict, (e.g., through decentralised prosecutions, where States are bound 
by the same norm erga omnes, or international criminal tribunals) it is questionable how effective these are. 
According to Provost decentralised sanction measures are unlikely to generate concrete results as implied by 
lack of significant State practice in prosecuting grave breaches, see: Provost (2002) 348. Whether recent 
developments in International Criminal Law and the rise of criminal tribunals culminating into creation of the 
ICC will bring significant results remains to be seen. The analysis here therefore excludes these aspects. 
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3.2.1.2 Compliance Test: NIAC 
In NIAC, the argument that application of IHRL would undermine reciprocity and hence 
lead to non-compliance with humanitarian standards is not equally persuasive. The way the 
rebels are induced to comply with humanitarian norms of AP II lies in conditioning the 
application of the rules by a State on the capacity of rebels to implement them (Art. 1). 
Practice shows, however, that this is not enough to result in rebels’ compliance.109 This 
results from lack of systemic reciprocity, inter alia, due to the fact that rebels are not 
shielded from the effects of domestic law in contrast to government soldiers. While in IAC 
the AP I gives the combatants “the right to participate directly in hostilities” (Art. 43(2)), 
there is no such right in NIAC under the CA 3 or AP II. Nevertheless, it is easy to argue 
that State forces will retain such right through customary law while rebels will not.110 
Similarly, while IHL provides for a regime of prisoners of war in IAC (GC III), there is no 
such regime under NIAC where rebels may simply be detained as criminals. The crucial 
caveat is that, in contrast to criminals detained under the IHRL regime, the rebels captured 
under IHL are not guaranteed the right to habeas corpus, access to a lawyer, or to inform 
their close relatives of their whereabouts. The lack of systemic reciprocity thus ends up 
creating imbalance and potential for resentment on the part of rebels. Unilateral observance 
of IHRL on the part of a State (in cases where this provides a higher standard of protection) 
would, arguably, serve to alleviate this imbalance. 
Theories of compliance based on reciprocity models are less appropriate for 
situations where polarization of identities of belligerents is not as static as in international 
armed conflicts. Modern counterinsurgency theory shows that human rights excesses by 
States such as collateral damage allowed under IHL or detention without judicial review 
(not prohibited under IHL) only alienates population and perpetuates conflict.111 If this 
argument holds it follows that it is in the interest of States to apply as high standard as 
                                                 
109 Provost (2000) 161-162. 
110 This follows mainly from the structural bias inherent in international law where customary law reflects 
State practice and opinio juris of States. 
111 To certain degree this has been reflected in, e.g., US Military Counterinsurgency Manual (2006) para. 1-
132; US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) 22.  
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possible in NIAC. Unless a State engaged in fight with rebels is able to come up with 
effective means to discredit discourses in which it figures as careless oppressor, it will 
never be able to diminish domestic support of rebels and certainly not support coming from 
abroad (e.g., from diasporas). Collateral damage and detention incommunicado will 
continue in providing just enough fuel to rebels in terms of material and financial support 
sources. The principle of best protection would thus introduce standards that make more 
strategic sense and is therefore viable.112 
In respect to compliance by rebels, the argument to be made here is that applying 
the highest standard by a State is not only good in terms of ending the conflict but also in 
terms of rendering pressure within the local population on insurgents to comply with 
humanitarian standards or else risk loosing popular support. Hence, unilateral application 
of higher standard by State would actually increase compliance of rebels with IHL and 
potentially also with some additional norms of IHRL (though certainly not all as many such 
obligations are incapable of implementation by non-State actors).113 When it comes to 
compliance by rebels, therefore, the principle of best protection is viable as well. 
Nevertheless, the resort to the principle requires that both regimes are applicable.  
As a matter of law, the applicability of IHRL is not a contested issue under 
domestic settings and the challenge here rather seems to be to persuade States to expressly 
apply IHL in times of armed conflict as well.114 An argument in this regard is that 
application of IHL provides an inducement for rebels to comply with humanitarian norms. 
Another argument is that this brings about accountability of rebels for violations of the 
laws and customs of war that is likely to be more elaborate than what a domestic legal 
system would provide on its own. Furthermore, it also allows States to be more flexible 
                                                 
112 Even if one disagreed with the assumption that States are rational actors, this would not impinge on the 
argument of viability. The argument that there is a strategic sense in resort to higher standards does not serve 
to advance the position that it is ‘likely’ that States will do so but only that it is viable for them to do so.  
113 It is especially unrealistic to expect rebel groups to guarantee the right to habeas corpus to detainees as 
this would require them to have an effective judicial system. 
114 In domestic setting States tend to consider the threshold for what constitutes ‘armed conflict’ as set very 
high, see: Gross and Aoláin (2006) 360. 
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once it comes to peace negotiations as explained bellow. At the same time, if the principle 
of best protection is adhered to, such application will not impinge on protections afforded 
by IHRL but rather strengthen them. 
Consider for example a scenario of a country that just finally reached an end of a 
civil war where a large number of the population, say 20%, constituted, or collaborated 
with, rebel forces. Should a State prosecute possibly thousands of individuals for murders 
under domestic law for killings of soldiers even in cases where such killing was not in 
violation of IHL? Similarly, should a State prosecute tens of thousands other collaborators 
for treason? As described in more detail bellow, while IHL leaves States with a 
discretionary power to give amnesty, IHRL does not necessarily open up for such 
discretion. 
Under IHRL, one issue is whether there is a duty on the part of the State to 
prosecute violations. ICCPR requires States to “ensure” the rights set forth in the covenant 
(Art. 2(1)). In respect to the right to life (Art. 6) this means that State is required not only to 
abstain from actions that undermine this right but that it also must take “appropriate 
measures” to protect against non-state actors that do so.115 Furthermore, in case of violation 
there must be a possibility for effective remedy (Art 2(3)). Consulting the provisions does 
not give a clear answer then. On the one hand the rules strongly encourage prosecution 
while, on the other hand, the rules do not contain an express obligation to prosecute. The 
issue was dealt with in the case HCMA v. The Netherlands where the Human Rights 
Committee observed that, “the Covenant does not provide for the right to see another 
person criminally prosecuted”116. The fact that there is no explicit obligation to prosecute 
under IHRL,117 however, does not automatically mean that the regime allows for 
amnesties. Granting of amnesties is seen as a failure of the duty to ensure human rights and 
as a practice encouraging further violations. IHRL does not prevent the State (or families of 
the fallen soldiers) to seek redress under the domestic law, quite to the contrary, it enables 
and facilitates it. Such prosecutions could go way beyond prosecuting for killings. If other 
                                                 
115 UNHRC, General Comment No. 31 (2004) para. 8. 
116 H.C. M. A., HRC (1989) para. 11.6. 
117 Ireland v. UK, ECtHR (1978) para. 10; Velasquéz-Rodríguez, IACtHR (1988) para. 166. 
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actions of rebels are classified as treason under the domestic law, this would result in tens 
of thousands of people in some way associated with the former rebels in facing harshest of 
sentences and, in case the country has not abolished it, even death penalty. While there is 
no general prohibition against amnesties under IHRL, the regime neither provides for such 
discretion.118 From a policy perspective it is hardly feasible to argue in favour of them 
under the rubric of IHRL where they are conceived of in different contexts. For example, in 
the context of elaborating on the prohibition of torture, the Human Rights Committee 
stressed that, “amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate 
such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that 
they do not occur in the future”119. Torture, however, just like many other breaches of the 
laws and customs of war, would also be considered as crime under IHL (for which 
amnesties should not be given as argued bellow). In spite of this fact, the IHRL regime 
simply frames all rebels and collaborators as criminals that need to be prosecuted and 
punished. 
IHL gives more flexibility to States when it comes to granting of amnesties. AP II 
expressly provides that the State “shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in the armed conflict” (Art. 6(5)). Although the word 
‘endeavour’ allows for some leeway, the provision gives a very strong legal argument in 
favour. It does not mean that a State should (or could) give amnesties for acts that fall 
under the rubric of international criminal law.120 In respect to the draft of the article the 
USSR, for example, stated that that the text “could not be construed as enabling war 
criminals, or those guilty of crimes against peace and humanity, to evade severe 
punishment in any circumstances whatsoever”121 and the same position has also been 
                                                 
118 In cases were States decide to proceed with granting amnesties, this must then be guided by the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
119 General Comment No. 20, HRC, (1992) para. 15. 
120 That war crimes can arise under NIAC has become generally accepted since the initially controversial 
Tadic ruling, see: Tadic Jurisdiction, ICTY (1995) para. 97. 
121 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1976) 319 para. 85. 
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maintained by the ICRC.122 To be able to make a use of this provision, however, requires 
from the State not to apply IHRL exclusively but to admit application of IHL. 
The example elaborated above is also useful for the purpose of clarifying possible 
misunderstandings when it comes to application of the principle of best protection. First, 
the principle presupposes a norm conflict. As the IHRL does not contain a prohibition 
against amnesties, there is no norm conflict in the strict sense. Although there is a conflict 
in the wide sense, it is not a genuine conflict because it allows for accommodation via 
interpretative means. Second, the principle presupposes that, from the perspective of a 
victim, two norms that that are in conflict are applicable. Here, however, we are faced with 
the situation where there are two conflicting perspectives of victims with rebels and 
collaborators on the one side and the fallen soldiers and their families on the other. Hence, 
the application of the principle of best protection is neither necessary nor possible in this 
case. Another example bellow will illustrate a case when the principle of best protection 
can be applied successfully. The following example also serves to advance the argument 
that applicability of IHL in times of armed conflict is in the interest of States as it enhances 
accountability of rebels. 
The standard of protection against torture is higher under IHL than under IHRL.123 
This is due to the fact that under IHL the definition of torture has less stringent 
requirements. As a result, accountability for torture is better achieved by resorting to the 
respective norm of IHL through the principle of best protection. 
Unlike under IHRL, IHL does not contain a public official requirement. While 
ICCPR simply prohibits torture (Art. 7), CAT, a more specific human rights treaty in this 
regard, elaborates that the protection applies only against torture that is perpetrated “at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person in an 
official capacity” (Art. 1). Under IHL in contrast, CA 3 and AP II provide for the 
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prohibition of torture without any further requirement.124 The public official requirement is 
also missing in the ICC Elements of Crimes when it comes to both torture as a war crime 
(Art. 8(2)(c)(i)) and torture as a crime against humanity (Art. 7(1)(f)). The ICTY 
considered elements that constitute torture under customary law in Kunarac and held that, 
“the public official requirement is not a requirement under customary international law in 
relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual”.125 Hence, under IHL anybody 
committing torture, whether somehow linked to official capacity or not, will be accountable 
before the law. Under IHRL, however, accountable will be only those linked to official 
capacity although a State will remain accountable in cases where it can be shown that the 
State failed to ensure respect for the prohibition. 
At least in the context of crimes against humanity, IHL unlike IHRL does not 
contain a specific purpose requirement. While CAT requires torture to be perpetrated “for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind” (Art. 1), there is no such requirement under IHL. As was 
already mentioned, the CA 3 and AP II contain no further requirements. In respect to the 
crime against humanity of torture (Art. 7(1)(f)), the ICC Elements of Crimes expressly 
states that, “no specific purpose needs to be proved for this crime.”126 If the meaning of 
torture under IHL is interpreted in the light of ICL, the requirement of purpose will not be 
present in cases were torture constitutes a crime against humanity. Whether the case of 
torture constitutes a crime against humanity or not, IHRL only provides for protection 
against torture where it is perpetrated with a specific purpose. IHL, on the other hand, 
provides for protection against torture, at least where it constitutes a crime against 
humanity, even where it is perpetrated without any purpose. In conclusion, IHL provides 
for accountability for torture where IHRL does not in respect of the specific purpose 
requirement as well.  
                                                 
124 Art. 3(1)(a) GC I – GC IV; Art. 4(2)(a) AP II. 
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126 This is expressly provided in the footnote number 14 to the ICC Elements of Crimes. 
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As the requirements of official capacity and specific purpose restrict protection 
against torture under IHRL, the principle of best protection will decide in favour of IHL 
which, in this case, provides for a higher protective standard. There is no norm conflict in 
the narrow sense. As was mentioned in the introduction (supra 1.2.), narrow definition of 
norm conflict requires a situation where two obligations could not be simultaneously 
abided by without one breaching another. In this case, however, application of the IHL 
norm would not breach the obligation of the competing IHRL norm. There is, however, a 
norm conflict in the wider sense as the application of the two norms leads to two different 
legal results. Due to the fact that under IHRL the requirements are expressly required 
whereas under IHL the same conditions are expressly excluded, this norm conflict can not 
be accommodated through interpretation and is therefore genuine. The norm in question – 
prohibition against torture – aims at protection of the same addressees, in this case all 
individuals. Hence, there is no problem in applying the principle of best protection. 
This section argued that compliance with applicable law pursuant to the principle of 
best protection is a viable option for States and that this is also likely to enhance 
compliance by rebels. Nevertheless, the principle is predicated upon applicability of both 
IHRL and IHL. Since States are reluctant to expressly apply IHL, two examples were 
advanced to illustrate both why this is a good policy and, simultaneously, to clarify how the 
principle of best protection works in practice. In the last example, prohibition against 
torture in IHL trumped IHRL. When it comes to issues of deprivation of life and detention 
it will be mostly IHRL norms trumping IHL. Yet, how are soldiers to comply with norms 
when their content in situations of armed conflict is contested even by lawyers? 
3.2.2 The Specificity Requirement 
First of all, in order for commanders and soldiers to do their work both effectively and in 
accordance with law, they need very clear and specific rules. Situations where matters of 
life and death often depend on split-second decisions do not allow for complicated on-the 
ground assessments. The rules need not only to be understood and trained, it is also 
necessary that they allow for easy application once the soldiers are deployed in the field. 
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As some have argued, there is a greater likelihood of compliance with IHL that developed 
in light of military considerations than with vague human rights.127 
Secondly, non-compliance with norms addressing deprivation of life goes hand in 
hand with individual criminal responsibility. It is this overlap with criminal law – where the 
principle nullum crimen sine lege certa (prohibition of unclear terms in criminal statutes) 
provides protection from the law itself – which necessitates clarity. 
This section argues that under IHL the rules provide much better guidance than 
IHRL when it comes to issues of targeting, and detention in IAC but cautions that the 
situation is different in NIAC. The two issues are crucial in that they pertain to the area of 
combat operations where the room to engage in legal deliberations is restricted. Not all 
issues that are regulated by IHL, however, are of such a nature. A typical example is that of 
repatriation of prisoners of war after cessation of hostilities. This provides a room for 
arguing that IHRL can play a limited role in such cases although, in the final analysis, it 
does not give persuasive reasons to use the principle of best protection in IAC. The 
situation is dramatically different in NIAC, however, where even the basic IHL rules 
pertaining to targeting and detention remain ambiguous. As a result, the requirement of 
specificity does not run against the employment of the principle of best protection in NIAC 
situations. 
3.2.2.1 Specificity Test: IAC 
In respect to conduct of hostilities in IAC, the rules of IHL offer a much higher level of 
legal determinacy than IHRL. As human rights provisions tend to be vague, one needs to 
rely heavily on jurisprudence of courts. There is a caveat, however, that in most cases the 
standards developed by courts will remain context dependent. Hence the rule that, “no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (Art. 6(1) ICCPR) or the rule allowing use of force 
that is “no more than absolutely necessary” (Art. 2(2) ECHR) will attain different meanings 
in different situations. One can not expect that a court will judge in the same way issues 
arising in times of armed conflict as in times of peace. As a result, IHRL norms not only 
lack in specificity (they are vague), they also lack in determinacy (their content changes 
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according to context). The norms of IHL, in contrast, are much more specific, especially 
when it comes to issues such as targeting (that is regulated by a whole set of numerous 
interlocking norms) or detention of combatants (to which a whole regime of extremely 
detailed norms is devoted). Moreover, they are made with one context in mind – that of 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, there are also issues in respect to which IHL norms are either 
less elaborate than respective norms under IHRL, or in respect to which both IHL and 
IHRL are equally specific.  
In cases where IHL norms are less elaborate than respective norms under IHRL, 
e.g., section regulating fair trial (Arts. 72-79 AP I), these differences can be accommodated 
by interpreting the former in the light of the latter. For example, under IHL those facing 
prosecution shall be subject to a court “respecting the generally recognized principles of 
regular judicial procedure” (Art. 74(4) AP I). The provision goes on the say that such 
principles “include” those listed bellow (Art. 74(4)(a-j)), hence implying that the list is not 
exhaustive. That a reference may be made to IHRL is expressly provided for in the 
beginning of the same section that refers to “other applicable rules of international law 
relating to the protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict” 
(Art. 72 AP I). In this respect the rules under IHRL dealing with the issue provide more 
specific guidance (Arts. 14-16 ICCPR). In cases where there is no norm conflict even in the 
broad sense, the principle of best protection is irrelevant and it is rather the principle of lex 
specialis that is more suitable in guiding the interpretative process. 
Yet, one can not ignore issues in respect to which both IHL and IHRL have very 
specific norms that clash. In cases where prisoners of war are likely to be tortured as 
traitors upon repatriation, a conflict of norms in the narrow sense will arise. While under 
IHL “prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities” (Art. 118 GC III), under IHRL “no State Party shall expel, return 
(‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” (Art. 3(1) CAT).128 This 
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is due to the fact that neither of the two provisions creates rights but rather both impose 
obligations where if one is abided by the other becomes breached. As there is a norm 
conflict, the principle of best protection becomes relevant. Proceeding with the analysis 
from the perspective of a specific victim to be repatriated that faces the risk of being 
tortured, the principle of best protection points to the norm of non-refoulement as providing 
the highest standard of protection. If, however, one accepts the argument that the principle 
of non-refoulement belongs to jus cogens,129 the resort to the principle of best protection is 
not necessary. The obligation to repatriate simply can not be interpreted as being in breach 
with jus cogens as this would mean the GC III is void as a whole.130 
In conclusion, the argument that IHL norms are much more specific and clear when 
it comes to issues pertaining to conduct of hostilities in IAC is warranted as far as issues of 
targeting and detention are concerned (i.e the activities most specific to armed conflict). 
Moreover, where this is not the case, the resort to the principle of best protection is not 
necessary. This is mostly because norm conflicts that arise can easily be accommodated 
through interpretative process. In one case, however, the norm conflict was identified as 
genuine. This concerned repatriation after cessation of hostilities versus the principle of 
non-refoulement. Nevertheless, even here the resort to the principle of best protection is 
unnecessary as invocation of the notion of jus cogens achieves the same result. The 
principle therefore fails the test. That the principle of best protection is of more use 
situation is different in NIAC is argued bellow. 
3.2.2.2 Specificity Test: NIAC 
When it comes to NIAC, the argument that the rules of warfare need to be clear so as to be 
operative in the heat of battle hardly supports the position that IHL should enjoy higher 
status vis-à-vis IHRL. This can be illustrated on IHL rules concerning targeting and 
detention. 
The IHL rules applicable in NIAC do not provide clear rules when it comes to 
targeting. CA 3 provides protection against attacks to those who are “taking no active part 
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in hostilities” while the AP II protects civilians “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities” (art. 13(3)). Hence the question of life and death hinges on the 
meaning of ‘direct (or active) participation in hostilities.’ In this respect the ICRC has come 
up with three cumulative criteria that must be satisfied – threshold of harm, direct causation 
and belligerent nexus.131 It is unnecessary to go into the details of these requirements 
here.132 For the purposes of this section it is enough to briefly illustrate the problematic 
issues.  
One issue is whether a rebel who stops fighting and goes home (with the intention 
to return to fight the next day) can be lawfully targeted in her home while she is not 
fighting. Another issue is whether persons that engage in war-sustaining efforts without 
actually fighting (e.g., recruiters, trainers, financiers, propagandists, weapon smugglers) 
can be lawfully targeted or not. In respect to the second issue, the ICRC has taken the 
position that such persons can not be targeted even though they are members of the armed 
group.133 The argument is that under IHL (in IAC) one must always distinguish between 
those belonging to armed forces and those that do not. By transposing this principle to the 
level of NIAC, the ICRC insists that only those members of the armed groups displaying 
“continuous combat function” can be targeted on a continuous basis. This also gives an 
answer to the first issue, namely that as long as the rebel remains a member of the armed 
group where she retains the combat function, she can lawfully be targeted. This solution is 
not without problems. 
Unfortunately, in situations of insurgency, where fighters come and go (that is cease 
to be members only to become members again later) or shift functions (e.g., from fighters 
to financiers to commanders), targeting fulfilling this requirement becomes operationally 
very demanding endeavour. In addition, clear rules of targeting under IHL could offer 
potential for abuse in NIAC. This is because clear rules would provide dubious regimes 
with ‘recipes’ on how to lawfully eliminate enemies once the threshold for armed conflict 
was reached (something that the regime could easily influence itself). Hence, clear rules on 
                                                 
131 Melzer (2009) 46-64. 
132 For a concise summary see: Schmitt (2010) 250 para. 11. 
133 Ibid. 37-38; See also: Melzer (2008) 275-276. 
 37
targeting in IHL would in practice undermine important guarantees under IHRL. As a 
result of these concerns, the guidelines have not been widely endorsed and the issue is 
likely to remain contentious. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that there is a considerable 
amount of legal uncertainty in addition to the separate problem of lack of simplicity (an 
issue that is dealt with in the next section). 
 The issue of detention is also problematic under IHL when it comes to NIAC. The 
CA 3 and AP II presuppose that States will detain individuals during the armed conflict. 
The former mandates affording “judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples” (Art. 3(1)(d)) while the latter affords a whole list of basic protections to 
those whose liberty has been restricted (Arts. 4(1); 5). Neither the CA 3 nor the AP II, 
however, gives a State the right to detain. In any case, even if one accepted that such right 
could be deduced from the mentioned provisions, the question whom and under what 
conditions would still remain unclear.  
A meeting of experts sponsored by the ICRC and Chatham house came with a 
conclusion that existence of this right is “consistent with the spirit of IHL”134 in so far as it 
fulfils the requirement that it is necessary for imperative reasons of security. Of course, that 
a conclusion was reached as a result of an expert meeting does not make it a statement of 
lex lata. On the one hand, this interpretation is not consistent with the general rule of 
interpretation enshrined in the article 31 VCLT. The article requires that one shall proceed 
from the “terms of the treaty” and it is these terms that are to be interpreted in “their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” One can not supplant lack of terms with 
a spirit. Neither can one prove that the right to detain exists as a matter of customary law, 
without showing evidence of State practice accompanied by opinio juris.135 The ICRC 
customary study only shows that arbitrary detention during armed conflicts is prohibited 
(rule 99) but does not conclusively prove the existence of the right to detain. The study 
clarifies grounds for internment and procedural requirements of internment under IHL by 
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consulting IHRL.136 Hence, this methodology is insufficient to prove that there is such a 
customary rule solely under IHL, i.e., independent from IHRL and its requirements. 
On the other hand, however, there is a strong policy argument that in the absence of 
possibility to lawfully detain, IHL would create a perverse incentive for the rebels to kill 
rather than capture. At least in respect to rebels, the right to detain then should exist. It is 
questionable, however, whether such right without any further restrictions137 should be 
conceded to States. For the same policy reasons as with rebels, the right under IHL can not 
be denied entirely under IHL even for States. Yet, it can not be unqualified either. 
However, the already mentioned meeting of experts concluded that the alleged qualified 
right to detain “would probably not be acceptable under IHRL due to the lack of 
specificity.”138 Just like with targeting then, the issue of detention suffers from the fact that 
the standard is unclear under IHL. It is unnecessary to compare this standard with that of 
IHRL which is clearly more specific. The implication for the principle of best protection is 
that the principle would not bring into play a rule which is less clear, but rather the 
opposite. The same is true if one compares the IHL standard of targeting vis-à-vis the 
standard of use of force under IHRL as done bellow. 
When it comes to the issue of use of force, at the very least it is clear that under 
IHRL the force employed must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the 
permitted aims. Nevertheless, the arguments that the standard was developed for law 
enforcement operations or that it has never been tested by courts in respect to killings of 
rebel fighters139 should be taken into account.140 However, under ECHR, at least,141 there 
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is very little room to stretch this standard too far even in respect of rebel fighters. The 
Convention requires that “for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection” (Art. 2(2)(c)) 
the use of force must be “no more than absolutely necessary” (Art. 2(2)). Hence, in the 
absence of derogation (Art. 15(2)) the court must always ask itself the legitimacy question 
of whether there is another way of achieving the aim that would not involve deprivation of 
life of the specific individual – whether she is a rebel or not. As a result, a rebel fighter 
engaged in insurrection can never be killed simply qua being a rebel fighter. She can only 
be killed if that is strictly proportionate to the aim of quelling the insurrection. The 
principle of distinction does not exist under IHRL. True, the Court has, on occasion,142 
made an assumption to the negative (i.e. it assumed there was no other way but to engage 
in bombardment) simply by referring to the context of insurrection. Nevertheless, one 
should not underestimate the fact that it has never failed to ask itself the legitimacy 
question or to consider the relevant evidence prior to making the assumption.143 Moreover, 
the court has never conditioned the legitimacy test on analysis of whether those hit were 
civilians or fighters which leads to the conclusion that the legitimacy test is not restricted to 
non-fighters. To conclude, the standard under IHRL in respect to killing is more specific, 
albeit dependent on context, than the corresponding one under IHL. The principle therefore 
passes the test. 
The downside is that the IHRL standard is context dependent and implies 
operational difficulties. This brings up another question. Can soldiers engaged in difficult 
battlefield conditions be reasonably expected to abide by highly sophisticated norms? 
3.2.3 The Reasonableness Requirement  
Even where the standards restricting warfare are clear, they can still be excessively high in 
relation to what is possible to achieve under given circumstances and render thereby 
military operations ineffective. This would have further consequences leading to non-
compliance with such unrealistically high standards. Hence the aim of this section is to 
assess whether the principle of best protection would introduce unreasonable demands. Yet, 
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how far military effectiveness should go, i.e., what is ‘unreasonable’ is at heart a normative 
and discursive question. 
When it comes to wars on the international level, States have negotiated a series of 
IHL treaties that seek to preserve military effectiveness as much as possible. As the issue 
here is that of a State waging war against another State, the need for military effectiveness 
is generally understandable from the perspective of citizens of any of the two States. 
When it comes to wars on the domestic level, however, the image is that of a State 
fighting a war against its own population. Hence, from the perspective of citizens, the 
normative assessment of how much should be sacrificed in the name of military 
effectiveness is altered. As evidenced by IHRL treaties, very high standards of protection, 
whether ensured by complex norms or not, take precedence against considerations of 
military effectiveness. It is only when the gravity of situation meets stringent criteria that 
the protective standard can be lowered so as to allow for a higher level of effectiveness in 
combating the given threat. 
3.2.3.1 Reasonableness Test: IAC 
Should States, while engaged in war against each other, prefer higher but complex 
protective standards of IHRL for their commanders and soldiers rather than simple but 
effective rules of IHL? From the human rights perspective, the principle of discrimination – 
one of the most basic principles of IHL – is unsettling as it provides that, “people may be 
attacked and killed simply because of the uniform they wear.”144  
What a normative analysis can not ignore, however, is that, whether for better or 
worse, States are still the primary actors in international relations. In the framework where 
States are answerable primarily to their own constituent citizenry, the effectiveness with 
which any State can fight off alien threats will remain of the utmost importance. This 
impacts the consideration of ‘reasonableness’ as mentioned earlier. It is this normative 
scaffolding (or public discourse) on which the need for simple rules rests and it is within 
these confines where both the considerations of humanity and the considerations of military 
necessity serve as normative boundaries. Unless the prevailing discourse undergoes 
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significant changes, advocacy for more complex and stringent norms in warfare will remain 
vulnerable to charges of naivety and utopia as it is simple to dismiss them as 
‘unreasonable’. The principle of best protection therefore fails the test here. When it comes 
to fighting wars inside States, however, the underlying normative logic is different. 
3.2.3.2 Reasonableness Test: NIAC 
Prima facie, the argument that norms guiding the conduct of warfare need to be simple so 
as to allow for effective military conduct has enjoyed considerable support even in respect 
of NIAC. When the AP II was being negotiated, for example, all elements that were seen as 
too sophisticated to be easily applied were removed.145 It would thus seem that the issue of 
simplicity and military efficiency on the one hand versus complexity but higher protective 
legal standard on the other was settled in favour of the former. If this were the case, the 
principle of best protection would fail the reasonableness test here as well. Such a view, 
however, has to be rejected. The AP II is only one instrument out of many that are relevant 
in civil wars scenarios and hence can not be conclusive as to the normative consensus on 
the issue. Moreover, the normative logic brings into play further considerations. 
Under IHRL, high standard of protection is more important than high effectiveness 
of State apparatus to deal with threats it faces. What calls for sophisticated rules of checks 
and balances is precisely the effectiveness of the bureaucratic machinery and its possible 
abusive consequences in respect to its own citizenry. The logic of human rights regime 
does not loose relevancy upon an outbreak of civil war. In fact, the regime takes the 
possibility of civil wars into account and seeks to keep the conduct of warfare within its 
own confines by providing for the regime of derogations. 
It is for this reason that special police forces must conduct their operations under 
very stringent rules of IHRL even during extremely complicated counter-terrorist 
operations. Rules allowing the State forces to shoot ‘terrorists’ on sight simply per the label 
would put many civilians in danger. Given that objectives do not differ, there is no reason 
why special military forces could not be trained to abide by the same rules. Nevertheless, 
some have raised the issue that military training needs to be the same for NIAC and IAC so 
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as to allow for deployment of the same forces in different situations.146 This argument, 
however, is not convincing in an era where armies are differentiated into specialized units 
that have their own training programmes and different standard operating procedures.  
More importantly, at least in domestic context, States can simply make use of 
derogations once the conflict reaches a high enough level of intensity which “threatens the 
life of the nation”. The norms most pertinent in situations of armed conflicts guiding 
detention147 and deprivation of life148 can be derogated from. As breaches of the rest of the 
non-derogable rights would constitute breaches of IHL anyway, their impact on military 
effectiveness is irrelevant. Other IHRL norms enshrined in treaties that do not provide for 
derogation can still be limited as far as is required to secure “public order” (Art. 29(2) 
UDHR). Hence, it is difficult to see how the use of the principle of best protection would 
render military operations ineffective. 
The possibility of using derogations in respect to extraterritorial combat operations 
is a contested issue. Both ECHR and ICCPR only allow for derogations where “the life of 
the nation” is threatened (Art. 4 ICCPR; Art. 15(1) ECHR). The meaning of ‘the nation’ is 
traditionally understood to refer to the State making the derogation. One possibility would 
be to make use of the provision in respect to extraterritorial operations as well. This could 
be done by interpreting the term ‘nation’ as referring to the State where the military 
operation is taking place.149 In the context of individual military operations by States this 
has problematic implications. It would allow a State to derogate from its own human rights 
obligations when intervening into another State exactly in pursuance of the aim to bring 
down the other State’s political regime and to do this by otherwise illegal means. 
                                                 
146 This argument is mentioned in Sassoli and Olson (2008) 609. 
147 The prohibition against arbitrary detention (e.g., Art. 9 ICCPR, Art. 5 ECHR) are not listed as non 
derogable norms (see: Art. 4(2) ICCPR and Art. 15(2) ECHR). 
148 ECHR allows derogation from the right to life “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war” 
(Art. 15(2)). ICCPR does not allow for derogation from the right to life as ECHR but the term ‘arbitrary’ 
allows for relaxation in the same way in the time of armed conflict following the decision in the Nuclear 
Weapons, ICJ (1996) para. 25. This would not, strictly speaking, be derogation, however, and would thus not 
create the obligation for stringent control that the derogation regime provides for, see Arts 4(1) and 4(3). 
149 In the context of UN-mandated peace operations this was suggested by Larsen (2010) 449.  
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There are other possible avenues to address the issue of effectiveness in 
extraterritorial operations. As remarked by Lord Justice Sedley when referring to the 
doctrine of effective control developed by the ECtHR, “no doubt it is absurd to expect 
occupying forces in the near-chaos of Iraq to enforce the right to marry vouchsafed by Art. 
12 or the equality guarantees vouchsafed by Art. 14. But I do not think effective control 
involves this. […] What it does is place an obligation on the occupier to do all it can.”150 
Although the expression ‘all it can’ is indeed vague, it points to possibility of developing a 
more flexible gradualist approach. Whether this approach becomes something more than 
just a personal opinion of one judge, however, remains to be seen. 
 Another argument against applying the principle of best protection also relevant to 
NIAC is that application of one regime (as opposed to some combination of the two) offers 
“the clear advantage of being operational in difficult conflict environments.”151 However, 
the principle of best protection does not require complex interpretative deliberations as 
would be required under the complementarity theory. Indeed, it would be valid to object 
that to be able to constantly assess which paradigm, whether that of law enforcement or 
that of hostilities, does any given situation fall into is unrealistic on the battlefield.152 That 
would demand from soldiers and commanders to be able to constantly shift attitude and 
mindset from one situation to another.153 This is not the case here. As long as both regimes 
are applicable, it simply requires application of the highest protective standard irrespective 
of the immediate context. Nevertheless, this position has been criticized as it can be 
difficult to determine what the better standard actually is.154 However, as long as one takes 
purely legalistic approach, disregards contextual complexity, and puts focus on the interests 
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of concrete individuals, the decision as to which of the two conflicting standards offers a 
higher standard of protection is pretty straightforward. Moreover, for cases where both IHL 
and IHRL are applicable, it is not at all impossible to conceive of clear guidelines 
identifying the highest standards of protection.155 
3.2.4 The Integrity Requirement 
The proceeding sections will deal with the so called ‘law of unintended consequences.’ The 
term does not refer to law in legal sense but rather serves as an idiomatic warning that an 
intervention in a complex system tends to lead to outcomes that are both unexpected and 
undesirable. The focus here will be on the regimes as such with the aim to assess possible 
negative implications on both the IHL and the IHRL regimes arising from the principle of 
best protection. 
3.2.4.1 Integrity Test: IAC 
From the perspective of IHRL, there is a concern of undermining its purported jus contra 
bellum156 and legitimizing war.157 The principle of best protection would bring in IHRL to 
the context of deprivation of life in wars. Yet, if international wars were fought under 
IHRL, how could one at the same time say that there is a human right to peace? Strictly 
speaking, the result would point to the return of the just war doctrine where war is waged in 
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order to bring peace and where, to the extent possible given the conditions of war, 
innocents among enemies are given protection. This is indeed hardly a desirable result and 
therefore the principle fails the test. 
3.2.4.2 Integrity Test: NIAC 
In NIAC we are confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, choosing to decide in favour 
of IHRL in NIAC (where no derogation has been made) through the principle of best 
protection could lead to watering down of IHRL standards. On the other hand, choosing not 
to decide in favour of IHRL could lead to misuse of military effectiveness under IHL by a 
State against its own citizens. Application of IHRL through the principle of best protection 
in NIAC would create an incentive for courts to make the IHRL standards effective in 
combat situations. There is a fear this would lead to watering down of the IHRL standards 
through a series of consecutive precedents as “allowing the State to kill combatants or 
insurgents under human rights law without showing the absolute necessity for doing so, or 
to detain preventively during armed conflict, might lead to allowing the State to do the 
same outside armed conflict.”158 Yet, how persuasive is this argument if we take into 
account the normative importance of the derogation clause? 
As already explained (in supra. 3.2.3.), the discursive logic under NIAC differs 
from that of IAC. It is not unreasonable to expect international human rights courts to do 
exactly what they are supposed to do – to protect citizenry against the unequally strong 
bureaucratic machinery of their States. Indeed, the stubborn reluctance of the ECtHR to 
expressly refer to IHL (which, by itself, would not imply application) can be explained by 
the fear of ‘letting the devil into its backyard’, that is, giving undue weight to military 
effectiveness. 
This brings us back to the importance of the derogation clause. If no derogation is 
made, the Court simply must judge the situation “against normal legal background”159 as 
the ECtHR did in the Isayeva case. From the perspective of Nils Melzer this reference 
seemed as “unfortunate”, “needless” and “unhelpful” because the court “did anything but 
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apply a ‘normal legal background’”160 Indeed, one can debate how close the standards 
employed by the ECtHR were to those of IHL in that case.161 Yet, from the perspective of 
Bill Bowring this approach actually made a practical difference in the burden and standard 
of proof and the evidential issues.162  Under the ICC Statute, he explains, launching an 
intentional attack with the knowledge that incidental loss of civilian life will ensue will 
constitute a war crime only if it can be established that it was “clearly excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (Art. 8(2)(iv)). This 
implies a high evidentiary burden of recklessness. In contrast, under IHRL, there is a 
presumption that a State will do what it can to protect the lives of civilians. This argument 
by Bowring is persuasive. The reference to ‘normal legal background’ does make actual 
difference. The conclusion to be made here from this is that the derogation provision serves 
as an effective reference point and hence presents a real incentive against watering down 
human rights provisions for the times of peace. In that sense it resolves the dilemma in 
favour of applying the IHRL in NIAC as long as it provides a higher protective standard. 
Resort to the principle of best protection would also not lead to the destruction of 
the IHL regime. To begin with, there is nothing in international law that would deny States 
the right to subject themselves to higher protective standards than those of CA 3 and AP II. 
When it is IHRL that provides a higher standard of protection in a given case, choosing not 
to use the standard of IHL regime does not water down its provisions. It is simply a case of 
a specific country applying a higher protective standard as it flows from more stringent 
obligations under human rights treaty that it ratified. As long as the court makes clear that it 
is applying IHRL and not IHL in that specific circumstance, the IHL regime remains 
intact.163 In case where this is to be done by a court whose jurisdiction is not restricted to 
IHRL (e.g., ICJ or domestic courts), the court must first recognize that there is a norm 
conflict and that this norm conflict can not be accommodated through interpretative means. 
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It can only be resolved and the principle of best protection is one possible way of justifying 
the resolution. 
In conclusion, since the principle of best protection does not necessarily imply 
destruction of either the IHL or the IHRL regime, it passes the test. 
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4 Conclusion: Result of the Viability Assessment 
That the IHL and IHRL regimes are applicable at the same time is today uncontested 
although how exactly is this relationship to be managed is still a matter of contention. One 
of the most contentious principles that were advanced is the principle of best protection. 
The analysis here illustrated, albeit very briefly, that the principle is not well supported as 
lex lata. Indeed there are various valid concerns when it comes to implications of the 
principle. The main part of the thesis (the second section of the chapter 4) tested the 
principle against four requirements. These were (i.) compliance requirement, (ii.) 
specificity requirement, (iii.) simplicity requirement and (iv.) integrity requirement.  
The results show that the principle of best protection is not viable for IAC 
situations. Compliance incentives on both the systemic and the normative level would 
break down. Namely, the reciprocity system would cease to exist while the application of 
the highest standard of detention would lead to destruction of the prisoner of war regime 
which would further create incentive to kill rather than capture. Hence, although the 
standard of protection would be ‘best’ on paper, in practice it would not provide any 
protection at all. Furthermore, the line between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello would 
become blurred and reintroduce just war doctrine. The principle of best protection therefore 
does not pass the viability test. 
However, as far as non-extraterritorial NIAC situations are concerned, the analysis 
shows that the application of the principle of best protection is viable. Compliance would 
not decrease (there are actually reasons to believe that it would increase); clarity of norms 
would actually improve; the problem of normative complexity could be resolved by resort 
to derogation; and integrity of both the IHL and IHRL would not be threatened. 
The issue of extra-territorial military operations, on the other hand, is more 
problematic due to the fact that the issue of extraterritorial derogations remains unresolved. 
As far as the use of force is concerned, the principle of best protection could not operate in 
favour of IHRL because, at least under ECHR, the regime would remain inapplicable to 
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most cases. As was mentioned in the chapter 3, this is because the latest case law does not 
consider that there is “jurisdiction” unless the person in question is in custody. With respect 
to the rest of human rights, application of more demanding standards of IHRL even under 
very difficult and hostile environment would be unrealistic unless some acceptable 
possibility for limitations of obligations is provided. 
4.1 Directions for Further Research 
There are other proposed solutions to solve the IHL-IHRL interaction than the principle of 
best protection the viability of which should also be evaluated. The other three proposed 
solutions are the lex specialis principle, complementarity theory, and human-rights based 
theory. Employing a single viability test to all four solutions would enable easier 
comparison as to respective implications and facilitate thereby ongoing discussions on this 
hotly debated topic. 
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